torical overview of their discovery and importance to the study of perception. Due to the longer history of serious scientific inquiry, a consideration of the topic of perceptual illusions seems an appropriate way to ground the study of memory illusions. I then turn to the topic of memory illusions and survey some of the major milestones in their study, as well. I provide a brief catalog of some of the main types of memory illusions that have been stud-FIG. 1. A shape illusion. The shaded tops of the two ied, and in the process I introduce the set of figures appear quite different in shape, but are actually papers that constitute the special issue.
congruent. Reprinted by permission of Roger Shepard and Lawrence Erlbaum, Inc.
PERCEPTUAL ILLUSIONS
Illusions occur in all sense modalities, although those occurring in vision have been We may ask why, historically, this imbalance has existed between interest in perceptual studied in greatest detail. The ancient Greeks were quite aware of visual illusions. The Parillusions and in memory illusions. One answer probably lies in the immediacy of perceptual thenon was constructed to overcome two common visual illusions that would have caused it illusions relative to memory illusions. Shown in Fig. 1 is the remarkable shape illusion that to look imperfect had steps not been taken in its design and construction to counteract their Shepard (1981) created. The darkened parts (the tops of the figures) appear quite different effects (see Coren & Girgus, 1978) . Aristotle described the moon illusion-the fact that it in shape, but they are actually congruent. (Trace one on a sheet of paper and lay it over looks larger at the horizon than when overhead-and also described the illusion of touch the other, if you need to be convinced.) Such a remarkable demonstration provides immedi-that still bears his name (Benedetti, 1985) .
Closer to our own times, scientific interest ate and convincing evidence of a fascinating process at work, one worthy of serious and in perceptual illusions began in the early 1800s and had exploded by the turn of the thoughtful study. Most visual illusions have just this quality. Even if memory illusions oc-century. In 1832 Louis Albert Necker, a crystallographer, noted a curious effect he had discur routinely in life-and I think they dothe evidence for their occurrence is quite dif-covered in gazing at crystals: Line drawings of crystals would spontaneously reverse in depth ferent. Usually the events in question have long since disappeared from life's stage and when an observer stared at them. This observation gave rise to the familiar Necker cube. we can believe that our memories are right, despite claims to the contrary that may be pro-In 1854, J. J. Oppel reported the curious observation that a certain distance of linear extent vided by others. If we simply look at the two shapes in Fig. 1 , we are not aware of the illu-appeared longer if it were filled (say, with lines) than if it were unfilled. Coren and Girsion at all-one shape is simply perceived as quite different from the other. It is only if gus (1978) estimated that over 200 scientific papers appeared on perceptual illusions in the we are told to check that we can convince ourselves of the difference. This critical 50 years after publication of Oppel's (1854) paper. Many illusions identified during this checking operation usually is not possible for remembered events.
period still bear the names of their discoverers: Zöllner, Müller-Lyer, Ponzo, Ebbinghaus, and The purpose of this essay is to introduce the special issue of the Journal on the topic so on. One important theoretical contribution from this era came from Hermann von Helmof memory illusions. First I consider the topic of perceptual illusions, providing a brief his-holtz, who offered a general approach to per-ception still found in many theories today. As holtz's theme in this quote reverberates to the present day through the writings of scholars Coren and Girgus (1978, page 9) put it, ''He proposed that, in general, perception in the studying perception, but it is not a uniform view. Kolers (1964, p. 98) noted that ''Illuadult observer is based on unconscious inferences that the mind makes about the pattern sions have not always had a good standing among the investigators of perception. When of stimulation in the nervous system. Since most stimulus arrays are ambiguous, the ob-perceptual illusions were introduced as a topic of study in the nineteenth century, the prevailserver must interpret the sensory stimulation arriving in the brain in light of his knowledge ing attitude about them was that they were mere parlor tricks-minor imperfections or of the environment. Thus perception is an inductive process wherein the observer uses his errors'' in the workings of perception. (Kolers went on to discredit this view.) experience to interpret the patterns of excitation in his receptors.'' Helmholtz called this
The study of illusions has occupied center stage in the study of perception since the turn constructive process unconscious inference because when people create their perceptual of the century and has even given rise to entire theories that developed largely to explain their world, they are unconsciously weaving together data from the senses with prior knowl-occurrence (e.g., the transactional approach to perception proposed in the late 1940s and edge about the world. A classic example of unconscious inference occurs in depth percep-early 1950s by Ames, Ittelson, and Kilpatrick and based on the remarkable demonstrations tion, wherein the two-dimensional display on the retina gives rise to the experience of a they produced (e.g., Ittelson, 1952; Ittelson & Kilpatrick, 1951) . In 1978 Coren and Girgus three-dimensional world through the use of many cues that are combined without our estimated that over 1000 articles had been published on the topic of perceptual illusions. awareness. The role of the active perceiver appears throughout the history of the study of Now, 18 years later, hundreds more have appeared and whole books are devoted to special perception (Neisser, 1968) . Rather than the external world merely being projected onto illusions, such as the edited volume by Hershenson (1989) on the moon illusion. the retina and faithfully transmitted to the brain, most perceptual theorists have empha-
In the next section I turn to considering why illusions and errors have not, until lately, sized that top-down, constructive processes help determine what we perceive. In The played a central role in research and theory about human memory. Before leaving the Principles of Psychology, William James described his general law of perception, topic of perception, however, consider one more quote noting the importance of studying which he believed was well substantiated: ''. . .whilst part of what we perceive comes how systems fail in helping to understand how they normally operate. Gregory and Gombrich through our senses from the object before us, another (and it may be the larger part) always (1973) wrote that ''Illusions are also tools for discovering processes in perception. In medicomes . . . from our own head '' (1890, Vol. II, p. 108) .
cine, in engineering, and very frequently in biology, the abnormal and surprising lead to The topic of illusions plays a large role in these constructive views of perception (e.g., key ideas and facts for understanding the normal. So here we may expect abnormal percepGregory, 1970). Helmholtz (1881) wrote, ''The study of what are called illusions of the tions (deviations from truth) to give insights and data for understanding normal (correct) sense is, however, a very prominent part of the psychology of the senses; for it is just perception'' (p. 7). We may hope that studying illusion and error can play the same role in those cases which are not in accordance with reality which are particularly instructive for advancing our understanding of human memory. The study of perceptual illusions may discovering the laws of those processes by which normal perception originates.'' Helm-need to become an integral part of the study of memory illusions, as they both reveal con-this sort of procedure is that the investigator typically has no reliable way to check the acstructive errors in the overall cognitive system. Later I consider some illusions that could curacy of a reported recollection'' (p. 5). We may add that this difficulty-lack of control be classified as either perceptual or memory illusions, illustrating that no firm boundaries over the original events-plagues many modern treatments of the question of accuracy and exist between these phenomena. inaccuracy in memory. The experimentalist's MEMORY ILLUSIONS credo is that unless one can be sure as to the course of original events, one cannot make Perceptual illusions reveal the constructive nature of perception: We can misperceive a strong claims and statements about the accuracy or inaccuracy of later recollections. stimulus while it appears before us under leisurely and optimal viewing conditions, as in There is a sense in which the study of memory errors is quite old. After all, every time Fig. 1 . If perceiving is conceived as an active process, one full of inference and hence at subjects provide intrusions in recall tasks or make false alarms in recognition tests, these least occasional error, then it is hardly surprising that remembering would be so considered, errors could be interpreted as memory illusions. However, in the history of experimental as well (Neisser, 1967 (Neisser, , 1968 . After all, if the cognitive system can err in misrepresenting studies of memory, errors were rarely of interest in their own right. The emphasis has tradiobjects when they are present before the eyes, the opportunities for error when a person later tionally been on correct responding and errors were typically considered a methodological tries to recreate happenings of the past must be even greater.
nuisance, reflecting guessing or criterion shifts. Errors were most commonly used to The origins of formal memory research in Ebbinghaus's (1885 Ebbinghaus's ( /1964 great experiments correct accurate recall or recognition for guessing and other biases, as in signal detecprobably helped keep early researchers from examining errors and illusions. Ebbinghaus tion theory. Exceptions to this general methodological attitude concerning errors are delearned and relearned his series of nonsense syllables and measured the savings during re-scribed below, but it should be borne in mind that (at least until the 1970s), mainstream exlearning. The relearning and savings method was ingenious and set the field off on a scien-perimental psychologists were not usually interested in illusions of remembering that tific and sure path, but like any method, it was better adapted to asking some questions than might be reflected in errors.
The first experiments showing the inaccuothers. The method was generally unsuitable for investigating memory errors and illusions, racy of memory were conducted with children by Binet (1900) in France and by Stern (1910) despite the fact that Ebbinghaus had a keen interest in the topic of perceptual illusions. in Germany (see Ceci & Bruck, 1993) . Both investigators exposed children to objects or Nonetheless, one of Ebbinghaus's methodological contributions is critically important events and later tested their memories with a series of misleading questions. The results of even for the study of memory illusions. As Schacter (1995) noted in this context, both studies revealed memory distortions in the children. At about this same time, Mun-''. . .Ebbinghaus introduced a methodological innovation that has proved to be essential sterberg (1908) reviewed evidence of the unreliability of eyewitness testimony in his book, to evaluating whether a memory is true or false: he gained control over the input to the On the Witness Stand.
In a totally different tradition, Freud (1895) memory system. In earlier philosophical and clinical treatises on memory, discussion cen-began exploring memory distortions in the 1890s and continued to revise his statements tered on introspective recollections of past experiences by the writers themselves or by pa-on the subject throughout his life. His most famous idea was that of repression-the notients whom they observed. The problem with tion that painful early memories are banished ences of a variety of psychical forces. Thus the 'childhood memories' of individuals come to an unconscious state where they may be revealed only indirectly, through dreams, in general to acquire the significance of 'screen memories' and in so doing offer a reslips, and symptoms of psychopathology. Erdelyi (1985, Chapter 5) describes the many markable analogy with the childhood memories that a nation preserves in its store of legchanges in Freud's concept of repression, from people simply not wanting to think about ends and myths.'' However, without the methodological stricture of the experimental bad events of their lives at one extreme (Erdelyi & Goldberg, 1979) to a deep and mysteri-school-knowledge of the original events and how they occurred-Freud's various discusous process of psychological banishment of memories to an unconscious state at the other. sions of whether childhood memories are accurate or inaccurate is based more on conjecOne corollary of the idea that memories of threatening experiences could be removed or ture than on empirical evidence.
These two streams of study of memory illubanished to an unconscious state is that they could somehow reside in this state relatively sions I have briefly described-one based on experimental methods and the other rooted in intact and then be recalled (through therapy) at some later time in life. However, in his later the psychoanalytic tradition-have guided discussion of memory errors to the present writings Freud abandoned his earlier belief that childhood memories obtained during ther-day. However, as previously noted, within academic psychology the main issues in memory apy should be treated as genuine and emphasized instead the processes of distortion that research lay elsewhere. Researchers from early in the century worried about the course could occur during therapy. In 1910 he wrote that childhood memories are ''. . .only elic-of forgetting and its causes (retroactive interference and retroactive inhibition), but rarely ited at a later age when childhood is already past; in the process they are altered and falsi-worried about error and illusion. There are two prominent exceptions to this generalization, fied, and are put in the service of later trends, so that generally speaking they cannot be dis-however. The first is represented in the Gestalt tradition of memory research in which it was tinguished from phantasies' ' (p. 83) .
Two other types of distortions that Freud believed that memories changed over time in the directions that were in line with the Gestalt (1903) analyzed were paramnesias (or false recollections of forgotten events that took on laws of organization. Briefly, people would remember events in a more organized fashion subjective certainty), and screen memories (or cases when one memory substituted for an-(the events would represent good patterns) when they were remembered at increasing inother and screened it out of consciousness). Freud interpreted both in terms of defense tervals from the original event. For example, Wulf (1922) reported that visual forms were mechanisms to protect against psychic threat and analyzed several cases that seemed to fit remembered as being more regular and symmetrical over time, and many other researchthis mold. The difficulty with interpretation of screen memories, in particular, is that there is ers conducted similar studies. The topic remained of sporadic interest in experimental no rule to decide which may be the real memory and which the screen memory, except for psychology, but Riley's (1964) piercing review of the methodological difficulties and the ad hoc supposition (Schacter, 1995) . Nonetheless, Freud (1903, p. 68 ) likened memories of inconsistencies in results in this area quelled continued interest. Most commentators have early childhood to screen memories: ''One is thus forced by various considerations to sus-concluded more recently that nothing much was gained from this study (Baddeley, 1976 ; pect that in the so-called earliest childhood memories we possess not the genuine mem -Schacter, 1995) . However, as Loftus (1979b) pointed out, Riley's (1964) analysis of reory-trace but a later revision of it, a revision which may have been subjected to the influ-search from the Gestalt tradition did empha-size the effect of verbalization on memory. while violating most other strictures that careful experimentalists might prefer (Kintsch, The words that people used to label visual figures, for example, determined how they 1995). His data were in the form of sample protocols produced by some of his subjects were later remembered (e.g., Carmichael, Hogan & Walters, 1932) . The importance of ver-and showed numerous omissions, with the stories becoming shorter over time. More interbalization on memory continues to be studied to the present day, as represented in the current estingly, the subjects made errors of commission in which they added material to make the issue in Melcher and Schooler's experiments on verbal overshadowing. story more rational and consistent. Supernatural elements dropped out and in general the The second, and more important, contribution during the 1930s to the study of memory students seemed to convert the story more to the form of an English fairytale, sometimes distortions was publication of Bartlett's (1932) great book, Remembering: A Study in even tacking on a moral. Bartlett noted that this property of rationalization in the protocols Experimental and Social Psychology. Bartlett took it as axiomatic that remembering was brought the story in line with schemas with which the students were more familiar. imperfect and even argued that it would be unnatural for people to remember events ver-A few years before his death, Donald Broadbent (Bartlett's student) related to me an batim. Before turning to remembering, he devoted a chapter to discussing constructive pro-interesting story about rationalization in ''The War of the Ghosts.'' Briefly, it did not start cesses in perceiving. In one demonstration, he showed people a painting for a brief period of with Bartlett's subjects, but with Bartlett himself, when he created the materials. One of time and noted that their reports of what it contained were quite different and seemed to the most memorable parts of ''The War of the Ghosts'' occurs at the end, when an Indian depend more on the background and proclivities of the observers than on the content of falls down, something black comes from his mouth, and he dies. Bartlett's version put it the painting. Further, when he exposed the painting repeatedly, but with quite brief expo-this way: ''Something black came out of his mouth.'' Broadbent told me that Bartlett had sures, his subjects would often cling to their earlier interpretations and fail to perceive the revised this part of the story, omitting an offensive phrase. Sure enough, in checking actual scenes portrayed, a finding presaging that of Bruner and Potter (1964) years later. Franz Boas' (1901) original version, the sentence read ''Something black came out of his Bartlett argued that both perceiving and remembering were constructive processes mouth and blood came out of his anus.'' Broadbent opined that this version was too guided by schemas, or cognitive frameworks that people brought to the events and through vivid for Bartlett to present to his refined Cambridge students! In fairness, Bartlett seems to which they interpreted them.
Bartlett's most famous experiments were have rewritten the entire story to make it flow better than Boas' original literal translation, those in which college students read and later recollected an Indian folktale, ''The War of but this is the only case where an important change of content occurred. the Ghosts.'' In one type of experiment, which he called repeated reproduction, subjects reBartlett's (1932) book, so important today in hindsight, actually seems to have had little called the story from memory on at least two occasions, without intervening study. Typi-impact on the questions experimental psychologists asked at the time, as reflected in the cally, Bartlett required a first recall 15 min after his subjects (Cambridge University stu-mainstream literature of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. However, as noted below, the book dents) had read the story twice. Then he tested them at various later points in time. His exper-received renewed attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s when Bartlett's approach to imental methods were casual, to say the least, but he did at least control the input material remembering gained renewed interest and fa-vor. The legend of Bartlett's repeated repro-''There are probably many ways to do this recoding, but probably the simplest is to group duction experiments lives on today in most textbooks of psychology (introductory, cogni-the input events, apply a new name to the group, and then to remember the new name tive, and memory texts alike). However, to my knowledge no one has successfully repli-rather than the input event' ' (1956b, page 93) .
Recoding is an active process of transformacated his repeated reproduction experiments on materials like ''The War of the Ghosts'' tion and therefore the possibility of errors in recoding and later decoding may arise. Miller when they used instructional sets requesting that people remember the story. Gauld and (1956a) wrote: Stephenson (1967) found errors like Bartlett's when they told people to make up a story like A . . . more general technique for organizing our experience into convenient units is provided by the one they had heard, but not when they language. . . When you witness a scene or hear a asked them to remember the story. Wheeler story that you want to remember, you try to transand Roediger (1992) gave subjects repeated late it 'into your own words,' into the linguistic tests on both ''The War of the Ghosts'' and units that will fit into your own cognitive hierarchy. This highly schematic, verbalized abbreviaon another prose passage and found that they tion is remembered. Then when you try to recall actually recalled more on the second test than you must decode. Since the fit of words to experion the first, at least with short delays between ence is seldom as tight as the fit of laws to data, tests. It seems odd that experimental observathe decoding process often goes astray. You supply tions could live on for so long in textbooks details by secondary elaboration that are consistent with your coded memory. Often these details are when the original methods were so casual and wrong. (p. 132) when no one has successfully replicated the work.
2 The probable reason lies in the fact that most observers thought Bartlett's (1932 ) Miller (1956a , 1956b paved the way to the information processing approach to remembasic story about memory rang true, regardless of his methods and results, and if so, that as-bering, which has largely guided research for the past 40 years. As Koriat and Goldsmith sessment still seems accurate today.
(in press) have noted, research conducted in THE MODERN ERA this tradition has largely been devoted to issues of how much (how many units) could be The information processing approach to remembered, and errors have been given cognition began in the 1950s as researchers rather short shrift. However, nothing within carried concepts and methods from communithe information processing approach itself orcations theory and electrical engineering into dained this emphasis, as the quotes from psychology. In the 1950s Donald Broadbent Miller indicate; and some researchers did at-(1958) produced the first information flow diatend to error analyses. For example, Conrad grams and George Miller (1956a Miller ( , 1956b Miller ( ) pro-(1964 studied errors of short-term memory duced two papers that began a revolution in and concluded that they had a phonological the study of human memory. One of Miller's basis, whereas other researchers found semankey ideas was the concept of recoding, tic confusion errors in studies of long-term wherein information is received from the outmemory (e.g., Underwood, 1965) . However, side world in one form but is transformed and most researchers influenced by Miller (1956a, represented in a different way internally.
1956b) studied how material was organized so as to be remembered better. For example, 2 Bartlett's (1932) serial reproduction experiments, in Tulving (1962 Tulving ( , 1964 ) studied how subjects orwhich one person reads and recalls a passage, the second ganized random word lists into subjective person reads the first person's recollections and then re-units in multitrial free recall so as better to calls the information, etc., also induce systematic distorremember the words. Glanzer and Clark tions. These experiments have been successfully replicated (e.g., Paul, 1959).
(1963) developed the verbal loop hypothesis, seeking to show that when people are faced hypothesis of remembering (pages 284-286).
Perceiving and remembering were seen to be with visual information, they recode it into a verbal description and that this description amenable to similar interpretation: ''The analogy being offered asserts only that the role guides later recall.
Many different trends in the modern era which stored information plays in recall is like the role which stimulus information plays in launched psychologists on the road to studying errors and distortions of memory. I review perception'' (page 285). In neither case can the information to be used directly enter consome of the main trends in the field and, while doing so, show how articles in the current sciousness or be reproduced in behavior in a literal manner; rather, constructive activity issue fit in.
(top-down processing) operates on the inforNeisser's Cognitive Psychology mation and the perceiver and rememberer become conscious only of the product of this In 1967 Ulric Neisser published his great constructive activity. Therefore, ''. . .stored book, which gave an entire field its name and information is not revived, but simply used, set many of the topics that were to be the in the constructive activity of recall'' (page center of attention in the new field: iconic 289). Just as constructive activity can give rise memory, echoic memory, reading, imagining, to illusions in perceiving, the same is true in and so on. Traditional memory research in the remembering.
Ebbinghaus tradition was not much in evi-
Although it is not possible to pinpoint a dence, but more importantly for present purcause and effect relationship with certainty, it poses, Neisser capped his book with a chapter seems likely that Neisser's famous book, and on remembering and thinking that harked back especially its final chapter, may have helped to Bartlett's (1932) idea of remembering as a launch the renaissance of experiments in the constructive process. Neisser emphasized the 1970s that examined errors in prose retention unity of cognitive processes and noted that in the Bartlett (1932) tradition. perceiving, remembering, and thinking were all active and interdependent processes. It seems obvious that remembering depends on Memory for Prose: The Influence perceiving, but less so that higher cognitive of Schemas processes usually studied as issues of problem
In the early 1970s several groups of resolving and thinking are also involved in researchers began studying errors in prose retenmembering, at least to the extent that rememtion that implicated the active role of the rebering is conceived as a constructive activity. memberer in bringing his or her knowledge Neisser's (1967) assumptions were stated to bear in recoding information. Bransford and clearly:
Franks (1971) presented subjects sentences of less of whether they had actually been pre-nition tests composed in part of lures that bear various semantic relations to the studied sented in the study phase.
In a later study, Bransford, Barclay, and words. Underwood (1965) gave subjects a continuous recognition test in which they deFranks (1972) showed that people would falsely remember events as having occurred cided if each presented word had been studied previously in the list. When subjects encounwhen the events had only been implied by prose passages but not actually stated (see too tered a word that bore an associative relation to a previously studied word (e.g., to decide Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973) . For example, subjects studied sentences such as if chair had been previously presented, when in fact table had been), they were more likely ''Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them.'' Later subjects were to provide false alarms to the words (to chair in this example) than if there were no associaasked if the sentence ''Three turtles rested on a floating log and a fish swam beneath it'' had tive connection between the test word and prior words. Others replicated this effect (e.g., appeared in the passage and a large percentage said yes. Other research also shows that infor-Anisfeld & Knapp, 1968; Paul, 1979) , but it is sometimes rather small or even nonexistent mation implied, but not actually stated, is often remembered as if it had actually occurred (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984) . However, others have shown that the false recognition effect (Brewer, 1977; Harris, 1974) .
Much work in this tradition showed how increases with the number of previously presented words that are semantically related to what a person already knew, or the context in which information was presented, determined the test word or lure (Hall & Kozloff, 1973; Hintzman, 1988 ; Shiffrin, Huber, & Marinelli, whether and how it would be remembered. Sulin and Dooling (1974) showed that sub-1995). Underwood (1965) interpreted the false recognition phenomenon in this paradigm as jects would falsely recognize a statement about a person if an appropriate schema had being caused by implicit associative responses during encoding; when studying table, chair been invoked. For example, a week after reading a story about a troubled girl, subjects were might be aroused and therefore later recognized. With increasing numbers of related more likely to recognize the sentence ''She was deaf, dumb, and blind'' if they had been words, the chances of subjects producing the critical associates might be increased, thereby told the story was about Helen Keller than if they had been told it was about Carol Harris. accounting for the more powerful effect observed in later studies. Many other experiments of similar form have demonstrated the power of schema (and The great bulk of the evidence about memory distortion relies on recognition paradigms, scripts) in organizing incoming information, in line with Bartlett's (1932) & Griffin, 1978; and Spiro, 1980 , for exceptions in the prose tradition). Deese The experiments described in the previous section show that people will recognize sen-(1959) reported results of a paradigm that showed robust levels of false recall following tences or passages as having occurred if they are similar in meaning to previously studied presentation of word lists, at least for certain lists. Deese (1959) constructed his lists from prose materials. Similar phenomena have been uncovered in other paradigms in which sub-word association norms by selecting words associated to one target word. For example, jects study word lists and then are given recog-hill, valley, climb, summit, and top are all re-presented by two different speakers during study and subjects were asked on a later recoglated to mountain. Deese (1959) presented lists of 12 related words and then measured the intru-nition test to make judgments about which speaker had said words that were recognized sion of the critical nonpresented word from which the lists were derived, such as mountain. as old or studied. Payne et al. found that subjects were quite willing to indicate which of For some lists (ones in which there was a high probability of generating the critical nonpre-the two people had spoken words that had actually never been presented in either voice. sented target from list members, as measured by free association norms), the level of intru-The conclusion that they reached is similar to that derived from the remember/know judgsions, or false recalls, was quite high. Cramer (1965) reported similar observations, but neither ments: subjects apparently experience the recollection of these events that never happened study received widespread attention. Roediger and McDermott (1995) revived as quite real, as real as the recall of the word events that actually had occurred. ''False Deese's (1959) paradigm, replicated the phenomenon of high levels of false recall follow-memories'' may be a misnomer, at least from the subjects' viewpoint, because the experiing presentation of related word lists, and extended the findings in several directions. For ence of recollecting the critical nonpresented words appears as real to the subjects as their example, they showed that false recognition of the target words (the false alarm rate) recollections of the presented words.
Schacter, Verfaille, and Pradere used the equaled the hit rate in some conditions and that the act of recall later enhanced both accu-same paradigm to study development of false memories in amnesic patients. Interestingly, rate and false recognition. Further, using Tulving's (1985) paradigm in which subjects they found that patients were less susceptible to this memory illusion than were control subwere asked to judge whether they actually remembered the occurrence of words (rather jects. They argued that this outcome indicates that development of false memories in this than knowing that they occurred, but not specifically remembering the moment of presen-paradigm can be interpreted with the Reyna and Brainerd (1995) fuzzy trace theory (as did tation), subjects frequently remembered the words that were never presented.
Payne et al., too). In particular, Schacter et al. interpreted the finding of less false recall and Three papers in this issue use Roediger and McDermott's (1995) paradigm. McDermott recognition in amnesic patients as indicating that the gist representations that normally supreplicates the basic phenomenon and adds significant new information. For example, she port recollective processes are impaired in the patients, relative to normal controls. shows that multiple study and test opportunities cause the levels of false recall to decline, The paradigms introduced by Deese (1959) and Underwood (1965) and their variations but that they are still substantial after five study/test trials. In addition, blocked presenta-serve as tractable experimental manipulations for studying the development of false memotion of words leads to higher levels of false recall than does random presentation and, over ries. As noted by Roediger and McDermott (1995) , the robust levels of false recall and time, accurate recall declines, whereas false recall actually becomes somewhat greater.
false recognition are remarkable, because they occur under conditions that often promote Payne, Elie, Blackwell, and Neuschatz also replicate the basic phenomena reported by good verbatim (or reproductive) recall: simple word list materials, free recall tests that dis- Roediger and McDermott (1995) while adding important new insights. For example, the false courage guessing, short retention intervals, and the use of metamemory judgments (rememory effect grew over repeated testing (under conditions, unlike those of McDermott, in member/know judgments, modality judgments) that direct subjects' attention to the which there were no additional study opportunities). In another experiment, words were bases of veridical judgment.
Effects of Interference and Misleading
present in the scene, so these responses constituted errors. Loftus and Palmer (1974) argued Information that the question involving the powerful verb Perhaps the most studied way of systemati-smashed caused subjects to recode the accically distorting memory is presenting other dent differently and consequently to be more events or information to interfere with reten-likely later to remember broken glass where tion of a critical target event of interest. Müller none existed. and Pilzecker (1900) first identified the role The Loftus and Palmer (1974) paradigm of interference in forgetting and it has been eventually developed into what has come to studied, in various traditions, ever since. The be called the misinformation effect paradigm. critical roles of both retroactive interference In the standard case (e.g., Loftus, Miller, & (McGeoch, 1932) and proactive interference Burns, 1978) subjects view a scene (for exam- (Underwood, 1957) in producing forgetting ple, a traffic accident in which an automobile have long been recognized. Although error pulls into an intersection where there is a stop analyses played a role in the classic study of sign) and then later they are asked questions interference-for example, the curious pat-(or read a passage) that contain information tern of intrusions as a function of trials of about the original scene. Some subjects are interpolated learning convinced Melton and told that the sign was a yield sign (the misinIrwin (1940) that a Factor X (unlearning) formation condition), whereas it is referred to needed to be added to response competition in a neutral manner (a traffic sign) or not mento explain forgetting-the primary interest of tioned at all for subjects in the control condition. the times was not in how interfering informa-Typically, memory for the information in the tion created memory distortions and illusions. original scene is worse when misinformation has Rather, the interest was in the forgetting of been given relative to performance in the control studied information.
condition, although the magnitude of the effect At about the historic point when interfer-depends on many factors. ence theory had peaked and a decline in reThis paradigm has produced a huge amount search interest was occurring (usually dated of research (see Loftus, 1979a Loftus, , 1993b , for refrom the Postman and Underwood (1973) pa-views) showing how information coming after per), Loftus and Palmer (1974) introduced a an event can shape and mold remembrance of paradigm that bore formal similarity to a retro-the event. Interest centers both on forgetting active interference paradigm, but that was of the original event and, more importantly for used to ask different questions with different present purposes, on the case where subjects materials. They showed subjects a videotape come to remember the suggested event as acof an automobile accident and later gave them tually having occurred (Lindsay & Johnson, a questionnaire in which a critical question 1989; Weingardt, Toland, & Loftus, 1994). was embedded: ''About how fast were the two Two papers in the special issue are devoted cars going when they ___ each other?'' The to this problem. Mitchell and Zaragoza examverb was varied for different groups of sub-ine the effects of repeating the misinformation jects. For example, when hit was used, sub-on memory for the target event and for the jects estimated the speed at 34 miles per hour misinformation itself. Repeating the misbut when smashed into was used, the estimate leading statements makes subjects less likely grew to 41 miles per hour. More interestingly to recall the original events accurately. Roefor present purposes, when subjects were later diger, Jacoby, and McDermott examine the asked the question ''Did you see broken effects of repeated testing on recall of events glass?'' 14% of those who had received the in this paradigm. In particular, they provided question with the verb hit answered yes, conditions in which subjects were encouraged whereas 32% of those who had received to produce the misleading information on a first test, but then examined subjects 2 days smashed answered yes. No broken glass was later under strict instructions to recall only negative effects of verbalization on remembering. In line with Glanzer and Clark's events that they had actually witnessed during the first phase of the experiment, in the slides. (1963) verbal loop hypothesis, people remember the events as they described them to themSubjects who had provided the misinformation on the first test were still quite likely to do selves, not as they actually happened. so again on the second test (relative to control
Illusions of Reality Monitoring and Source groups). Further, subjects in this condition
Monitoring claimed to remember the actual occurrence of the suggested event, even though it had never
In the 1970s Marcia Johnson and her colleagues began a program of research that has happened. The misinformation paradigm introduced by Loftus continues to play a prominent identified a variety of interesting and important facts about accuracy and inaccuracy role in studies of memory errors (see the edited volume by Ross, Read, and Toglia (1994) for of remembering. In the original work (e.g., Johnson, Taylor, & Raye, 1977;  Johnson & recent reviews of these issues).
Raye, 1981), interest was in how subjects disVerbal Overshadowing tinguish between information derived from external sources (events that really happened) A situation related to that of Loftus' paradigm was developed by Schooler and En-and those that were generated by sources internal to the person (such as events that were gstler-Schooler (1990), which they called verbal overshadowing. Carmichael, Hogan, and only generated or imagined), or, to use the question that formed the title of a related paper Walter (1932) showed long ago that ambiguous visual stimuli were remembered in differ-by Anderson (1984) : ''Did I do it or did I only imagine doing it?'' Early experiments were ent ways depending on the verbal description given to the stimuli. Of course, in many situa-concerned with estimating the frequency with which events were presented externally or tions verbalization can aid memory, and many studies have revealed positive effects of re-were internally generated. For example, subjects show better relative frequency judgments hearsal and verbal elaboration. However, Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) argued for internally than externally produced events.
More interestingly for present purposes, the that verbalization may harm memory when the events to be remembered are difficult to more subjects imagined an event, the greater the impact on judgments of frequency that the capture in words. They have demonstrated this in a number of studies using stimuli from vari-event actually occurred (Johnson et al., 1977; Johnson & Raye, 1981) . Subjects confused the ous domains. For example, when subjects viewed faces and had to describe them, mem-imagined events with those that actually occurred in estimating their frequency, a failure ory for the faces was worse than when subjects did not describe the faces.
to monitor real events accurately, or a failure of reality monitoring, as Johnson and Raye In their article in this issue, Melcher and Schooler extend their verbal overshadowing (1981) called it. Johnson and Raye (1981) proposed that paradigm to recognition of the taste of wine. Untrained wine drinkers were impaired in people distinguish between internal and external events in memory both by the types of their recognition of wines when they engaged in verbalization during their initial tasting, rel-information encoded and by decision rules used when tested. Encoded representations of ative to the case in which they participated in an unrelated verbal activity. Consistent with external events are especially rich in perceptual information (sensory features or attritheir predictions, this verbal overshadowing effect did not occur in trained wine drinkers butes) and contextual information (such as time and place of occurrence). On the other who had considerable expertise in translating their tastes into words. We can expect to see hand, encodings of internally generated events are assumed to include considerable informamany more experiments on the positive and tion about cognitive operations that were used reading about the accident, as actually having occurred at the original scene (Lindsay & to encode the event. People are assumed to use these differences in information when de- Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994) .
In the present issue, Johnson, Nolde, and ciding on whether something ''really happened'' to them. However, confusions can DeLeonardis add important new information about the impact of subjects' emotional focus arise in some cases, such as when an imagined event may have been vividly imaged in a par-(either on themselves or on another person) on their abilities to accurately monitor the ticular time, at a particular location, and with considerable sensory detail. source of information. Johnson et al. asked people to focus either on how they personally Another critical aspect of Johnson' theory, as developed in later writings (e.g., Johnson, felt about statements that were read to them or about how they thought the speakers of the 1983, 1995) is the distinction between two general types of judgment processes (similar to statement felt when reading them. Although focusing on their own reactions to statements those proposed by others; Atkinson & Juola, 1973; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980) . made people recognize the statements better on an old/new recognition test, this self-focus Briefly, subjects can use either a relatively quick, nondeliberative heuristic process in mak-actually reduced their ability to monitor the source (to tell which of two people had spoken ing judgments or they can use more systematic processes that are slower and more deliberate. the statement). The difference in self versus other focus was eliminated, however, in an The heuristic process is quick and dirty, used to make snap judgments and resulting in errors experiment when subjects were instructed to focus on how they felt about the speakers when the snap judgment leads to the conclusion (for example) that something actually happened rather than (as in the studies described above) when subjects focused on how they thought when it only seems familiar because the person thought about it (or generated it internally). Sys-the speakers felt about what they were saying, a finding in line with predictions made from tematic judgment processes bring other features to bear on the decision as to whether something the source monitoring framework.
The contribution by Hyman and Pentland actually happened and are therefore less likely to be error prone.
in this issue also can be interpreted within Johnson's source monitoring framework. A large variety of evidence has been collected that supports Johnson's general ap-They use the technique of having people imagine events that may or may not have ocproach, which has been broadened to a general source monitoring framework (Johnson, curred during their childhoods and show that imagining the events sometimes induces peo- Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) . Information can arise from many sources that vary in mo-ple to believe that the events did happen. The events are, on the face of it, fairly improbable dality (auditory, visual, verbal, pictorial) , time of occurrence, place of occurrence, and so on, ones. This outcome agrees with others in showing the powerful role of imagination in rather than simply being external or internal. A primary type of data used to support the creating false memories (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1989 ; see too Garry, Mantheory is confusion that subjects show among sources, leading to interesting illusions of ning, Loftus, & Sherman, in press ). Imagining seems to involve brain mechanisms similar to memory. The source monitoring framework has assumed increased importance in the field, those used in perceiving (e.g., Farah, 1989) , so it is not surprising that imagining events as researchers have interpreted other phenomena under its umbrella. For example, the im-can make people later remember that they had happened (even when they did not). However, pact of misleading postevent information can be conceived as a failure of source monitoring; the positive effects of imagery have usually been emphasized by psychologists interested subjects may remember the stop sign, which was only suggested by a question or from in memory-how imagining studied events makes them more memorable-so the role of (if the subjects' attention is focused on performing some other task) this fluency may be imagery in undermining memory may at first glance seem surprising. However, Johnson's misattributed to some other source besides the past events. For example, Jacoby, Allan, Colframework permits us to understand how imagery can both make studied events more lins, and Larwill (1988) tested subjects' judgments of the loudness of background noise in likely to be correctly recalled, and imagined ''nonevents'' more likely to be falsely re-which words were embedded when some of the words had been previously heard and othcalled. In the former case, imagining adds additional cognitive operations to the encoded ers had not. When subjects had previously heard the words, they judged the noise to be event that serve to enhance later memory for the event's occurrence; in the latter case, the less loud than when nonstudied words were judged, despite the fact that the objective noise cognitive operations help make the ''nonevent'' appear real by specifying perceptual level was the same in the two cases. The facilitating effects of prior experience on hearing detail, which usually signifies an event that actually occurred (Johnson et al., 1989) . Other the words through noise were misattributed to differences in the noise levels rather than illusions on the border between perceiving and remembering are considered below, in the accurately attributed to memory for prior experience of the words. next two sections.
Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) manipulated Fluency Illusions: Misattributions the ease with which words were perceived on of Memory a recognition test by preceding them with a briefly presented prime. Subjects judged the Jacoby, Kelley, and their colleagues have developed an attributional view of memory words that were primed as more familiar on a recognition test, presumably mistaking the that is similar in some ways to Johnson's (1983) source monitoring approach (Jacoby, fluency of processing for familiarity. Jacoby and Whitehouse proposed that such fluency Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Kelley & Jacoby, 1990) . They borrow from attribution theory in may be the cause of déjà vu experiences (such as described by Titchener in the opening parasocial psychology, where (for example) emotional states are thought to arise from a partic-graphs). The enhanced fluency of an experience from a prior event that is not remembered ular combination of physiological arousal and appropriate cognitions induced by the situa-may create a strange sense of familiarity, with no obvious source to which it should be attribtion (e.g., Schachter & Singer, 1962) . Similarly, Jacoby, Kelley, and their colleagues uted. Whittlesea, Jacoby, and Girard (1990) and Whittlesea (1993) reported illusions of conceive of remembering as a combination of fluent processing of an event with the mental immediate memory that were similarly caused by manipulations of perceptual fluency. set that attributes the fluency to past experience, or to remembering. As in Johnson's Two papers in the current issue draw on Jacoby and Kelley's attributional framework. framework, Jacoby and Kelley distinguish different bases of judgment: a more intuitive, Lindsay and Kelley show that enhanced fluency can drive know judgments in Tulving's rapid, and nonanalytic basis on the one hand, and a more deliberate, reflective, and analytic (1985) remember/know paradigm. In their experiments, either easily solved word fragment basis on the other. For the experience of remembering there needs to be fluent processing cues, or ones that were difficult to solve, were presented as test cues following study of a of information (of it readily coming to mind) and an attribution of the fluency as arising word list. Subjects were told that the cues should remind them of list words and that they from past experience.
Several interesting illusions support Jacoby were to report the word and to judge whether they remembered details of its list presentaand Kelley's attributional framework. First, past events may lead to fluent processing and tion, or rather simply knew that it had been on the list. Most studied words were repre-we can look at our writing more as someone just coming to it, without being quite so egosented by fragments appearing on the test, leading subjects to believe that the fragments centric. Kelley and Jacoby studied these fascinating processes of judgment with an anagram were reliable retrieval cues for the list items. Lindsay and Kelley's primary interest was in solution task. When subjects had studied anagrams, they solved them faster on a later test judgments for a small group of words that had not been presented in the study phase. In this (a priming effect), but they misattributed this ease to properties of the anagram rather than case, making the solution easy led subjects to report the word as having been presented, but to their previous experience. Subjects' ordering of the general difficulty of the anagrams to judge that they knew it had been on the list (but did not remember the details of its was different when the anagrams had been studied than when they had not; presumably, occurrence). This interesting illusion of knowing depends a bit on assumptions used to ana-when subjects had studied solutions to the anagrams, they partly used fluency to deterlyze know responses. In addition, recall that Roediger and McDermott (1995) reported that mine the ease of arriving at the anagram's solution, or they relied more on nonanalytic subjects would often provide remember responses for nonpresented items recognized in bases of judgment. When anagrams had not been studied, subjects probably used more detheir paradigm. The differences between their results and those of Lindsay and Kelley may liberate, rule-based judgments. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, experience within a dolie in the tests and the types of processing they engender. The Lindsay and Kelley paradigm main may reduce one's ability to assess how others assess and comprehend the same inforcapitalizes on perceptual (data-driven) factors in producing fluent output, with powerful cues; mation, a form of adult egocentrism (as Kelley and Jacoby call it) that doubtless afflicts us this sense of false familiarity arising from perceptual factors may lead to know judgments. all. All college professors have had the experience of explaining an interesting point, with The Roediger and McDermott (1995) subjects produced an erroneous memory conceptually re-what they imagine to be great clarity, only to be confronted with the befuddled looks of lated to other memories and judged them as being remembered (rather than known) most of most of the students in the class. the time. One hypothesis is that facile processing
Illusions of Perception and Memory driven by perceptual fluency may lead to the illusion of knowing, whereas when material The illusions arising from perceptual fluency discussed in the previous section docupops to mind that is conceptually related to other memories, it may give rise to the illusion of ment the intimate link between perceiving and remembering, which can be easily demonremembering. This speculation awaits further research (see Rajaram & Roediger, in press , for strated either during the encoding or retrieval phase of memory experiments (as in the work related observations).
In another set of studies, Kelley and Jacoby of Jacoby and Kelley). Many illusions seem to lie on the border of perceiving and rememstudied how memory of past events may interfere with making good subjective judgments. bering. Consider the thought experiment of testing subjects' retention of the shapes in instructions to attend to the shaded space and a frequently suggested strategy, once a paper is written, is to put it away for a few weeks then asked, a few moments later, which was wider and shorter, the one on the right or the before revising it. Presumably this advice capitalizes on the intuition that our judgment of one on the left, they would doubtless respond that it was the one on the right. They would the goodness of our writing will be better once we have forgotten what we wanted to say and of course be wrong, as the shaded portions are identical. Is this an illusion of perception? an why we wrote what we did; if we wait a while, illusion of memory? or is it both? If the origi-what do you remember?). Obviously, the experimental situations blend into one another and it nal event is wrongly perceived, then usually the resulting memory will be wrong too, un-is impossible to say when perceiving is completed and remembering takes over in subjects' less some other factor corrects the false perception later (making memory for the event reports.
One memory illusion at the border between better, in a sense).
Another issue: Are sensory memories perceiving and remembering is the phenomenon of boundary extension, studied by Intraub (iconic and echoic) veridical, or illusory, or both, in different aspects? Sensory memories and her collaborators. Observers view a picture and then later remember seeing more of are thought to be quite faithful replicas of the original experience, at least for their brief life-the scene than was actually shown; it is as though the scene's boundaries have become times. On the other hand, the perceiver/rememberer still experiences events as being extended when it is remembered. The effect occurs both in recall and recognition tests (Inperceived that have disappeared. So perhaps sensory memories have both veridical and il-traub & Richardson, 1989; Intraub, Bender & Mangels, 1992) . In this issue, Intraub, Gotteslusory aspects. Like the questions above, this one about sensory memories is difficult to an-man, Willey, and Zuk examine the effects of brevity of exposure on the phenomenon, as swer conclusively. Similarly, the illusory phenomenon known as the McCollough effect well as testing after very short delays. They found that the effect occurs even when expo- (McCollough, 1965) can last for days. (The McCollough effect is an illusion of color that sure durations for the studied pictures are quite brief (250 or 333 ms) and when the reis contingent on the particular orientation of adaptation and test lines.) Is it a phenomenon tention interval is only 1 s. In conjunction with other evidence, they interpret the illusion as of erroneous perception, of memory, or both? These questions also illustrate again the diffi-arising just after a picture is perceived. In particular, subjects interpret a picture in terms of culty of rigorously defining what an illusion is; such a definition has thus far eluded psy-a perceptual schema that contains information likely to exist just outside the actual picture. chologists studying perceiving and it will probably be even more difficult to achieve for When the scene is comprehended, subjects remember information that did not actually exist remembering.
Several other types of illusion are also diffi-in the picture, but only in their schema used to comprehend the picture. The error is clearly cult to classify as perceptual or as memorial and both labels likely apply. Part of the problem memorial, in one sense, because boundary extension does not occur while subjects are lookis that the operational procedures for studying perception and memory are often formally quite ing at the scene, so it is not a perceptual illusion in the usual sense. However, the Intraub similar. In many experiments on perception of words or pictures, the stimuli are presented very et al. results show that the illusion develops very rapidly upon offset of the picture, prebriefly and subjects are asked to report what they saw (or heard) as soon as possible, or they sumably as it is still being interpreted. Therefore, the phenomenon falls at the boundary are asked to make a rapid decision or judgment about the event. In many memory experiments between perceiving and remembering.
Another illusion falling at this boundary is words and pictures are shown and the subjects are asked, after some retention interval, to recall representational momentum (Freyd & Finke, 1984) . In the original experiments, subjects what occurred or to make a judgment about the presented events. Often the primary differences received three computer animated rectangles (called inducing stimuli) and then later had to in the situations are (a) the duration of the original display, (b) the amount of time before a judge whether a fourth stimulus, the probe or test stimulus, occurred in the same position as report or judgment is required, and (c) the nature of the query (what did you perceive? versus the last inducing stimulus. On some occasions the three inducing stimuli implied rotation in rather small but Reinitz, Lammers, and Cochran (1992) and Reinitz, Morrisey, and Demb either a clockwise or a counterclockwise direction. The interesting finding was that sub-(1994) replicated it and showed similar results in encoding of faces (see too Solso & McCarjects were more likely to respond same to the probe stimulus if it was slightly forward of thy, 1981). The interpretation of such illusory conjunctions in memory, as in perception, is the final inducing stimulus in the direction of implied motion, as if the representation of the that features may not be tightly bound together into unitized wholes. Rather, features are freemotion of the inducing stimuli had momentum and was carried forward (hence the name). floating to some degree and, when two features are combined from different units, they The effect increased with the velocity of the implied motion and is not due to eye move-may be falsely recognized.
Two papers in the current issue use the illuments (see Hubbard, 1995, for a review). Again, it is difficult to classify this illusion as sory conjunction paradigm to explore the roles of attention and consolidation in encoding. Inperceptual, mnemonic, or both.
A third and final case to be considered is terestingly, both sets of researchers also used a neuropsychological approach in which pathat of illusory conjunctions in perceiving, a topic of study introduced by Treisman and tients with memory disorders arising from brain damage were tested. Reinitz, Verfaellie, Schmidt (1982) . Subjects are presented quite briefly with stimuli that contain several fea-and Milberg compared amnesic patients to control subjects in the basic recognition paratures, such as letters that differ in color (e.g., a blue R, a red M, a green C, and so on). The digm in which subjects are tested with previously studied words, conjunction words (the interesting observation, now replicated many times, is that subjects will often report seeing two syllables have been presented, but in different words), feature words (one syllable has objects that represent illusory conjunctions of features, such as a red R or a blue C in the been studied and the other is new), or completely new words. Control subjects showed above example. Because the displays are so rapid in this research, these errors have a per-the pattern expected from prior experiments:
The hit rate for studied words was much ceptual feel, yet they occur at a short interval after the perceptual display has disappeared. higher than the false alarm rate for conjunction words, and in turn this false alarm rate However, as we see in the next section, illusory conjunctions also arise in remembering. was higher than that for either feature words or new words. Amnesic patients showed a difIllusory Conjunctions in Memory ferent pattern in that they were unable to discriminate between studied words and conjunc- Underwood and Zimmerman (1973) and Underwood, Kapelak, and Malmi (1976) in-tion words. The patients seemed not to have formed a global representation of the words, troduced a way of studying illusory conjunctions in memory by presenting compound because parts of the words could ''float'' and be erroneously joined together, leading to words for subjects to study (e.g., handstand, shotgun). Later subjects were tested for recog-false alarm rates as high as the hit rates.
Kroll, Knight, Metcalfe, Wolf, and Tulving nition of previously studied words, words that had one syllable in common with the studied use a variant of the illusory conjunction paradigm on patients having left, right, or bilateral words (handmaid) or, in the most interesting case, words in which both syllables had been hippocampal damage. In a running recognition task in which subjects judged every prepreviously studied (handgun, in this example). Subjects produced more false alarms to the sented word as old or new, items could represent either previously studied items, conjuncconjunction test items like handgun than to either words with one syllable of overlap with tion items, single feature items, or completely new items. They found that patients with left the studied word or control words that were unrelated to the studied words. The effect was hippocampal damage classified more conjunc-tion items as old (i.e., they produced more ing evidence that hypnosis leads to illusory memories (e.g., Lynn & Nash, 1994; Whitefalse alarms on these items) relative to normal subjects or those with right hippocampal dam-house, Orne, Orne, & Dinges, 1991) . Subjects under hypnosis are often encouraged to generate age. Kroll et al. interpreted these results, and those from a similar experiment involving pic-everything they can think of to free associate about the event they are trying to remember. tures, as evidence for a binding process during consolidation of information occurring via the Much of the information obtained under this state is erroneous, although some is correct hippocampus.
The illusory conjunction paradigm using (but no more than that retrieved by nonhypnotized control subjects given extra time). The words, pictures, or faces may prove to be important in the study of false memories. It is difficulty comes later when subjects (back in their normal waking state) try to distinguish also worth noting that both papers discussed here (and the one by Schacter et al. described what actually happened in the target event from what they recalled during hypnosis. The previously) used memory-disordered patients to study memory illusions. Certain patients, available evidence shows that subjects who score high on hypnotic susceptibility scales especially those with damage to the frontal lobes and to the areas surrounding the hippo-often confuse events they retrieved under hypnosis with those that actually occurred and campus, display profound memory disorders. Although amnesic patients-those with dam-that they cannot even distinguish the memories they retrieved under hypnosis from those age in and around the hippocampus who are rendered incapable of consciously recollecting that they retrieved prior to the hypnotic session (Sheehan, 1988; Lynn and Nash, 1994 ; newly presented information-represent an interesting type of disorder, those patients Whitehouse et al., 1991) .
These findings of false memories induced with frontal damage who confabulate and claim to remember events that never happened by hypnosis bear many points of similarity with phenomena discussed previously. In a may turn out to be just as interesting in the study of memory illusions (Johnson, 1991 ; sense, hypnotized subjects are encouraged to provide their own misinformation about Moscovitch, in press; Schacter, Curran, Gallucio, Milberg, & Bates, in press).
events during the hypnotic session and it may even be that such internally generated misinHypnosis and Guessing Effects formation (in the form of guesses of what might have happened) could be even more The use of hypnosis in attempts to aid memory retrieval has a long and checkered history. powerful than externally presented misinformation in creating interference, although this The topic has been examined intensively for the past 20 to 30 years and there now seems hypothesis awaits experimental test. At the very least, subjects who are queried later seem general agreement that hypnosis does not serve as the key to unlock forgotten memories, to display reality monitoring and source monitoring confusions, not being able to tell what as some had hoped (see Smith, 1983, and Lynn & Nash, 1994 , for reviews and discus-actually happened from descriptions that they produced while hypnotized. In addition, the sion). Relative to appropriate control groups, hypnotized subjects generally recall no more Jacoby et al. (1989) attributional approach may help here, because as Schacter (1995) has veridical information than do control subjects and, on the few occasions when they have noted, ''The evidence suggests that hypnosis creates a retrieval environment in which peobeen shown to do so (e.g., Dywan & Bowers, 1983) , the increased recall comes only at the ple are more willing than usual to call a mental experience a 'memory,' and in which they exexpense of an increase in errors, suggesting a general criterion shift.
press a great deal of confidence in both true and false memories'' (p. 17). Although hypnosis does not lead to enhanced accuracy of retrieval, there is mountAlthough most researchers attribute the illu-sions created when subjects are hypnotized to source of information. Are some types of people more susceptible to memory illusions than the state of hypnosis per se, it may be that they are caused in part by the instructions during others? Considerable work has already been conducted with children in an attempt to deterhypnosis that lead people to produce erroneous information. That is, it may well be that mine how accurately they remember, especially for the practical purpose of whether nonhypnotized subjects who are instructed to guess during retrieval will show the same dif-children's testimony should be admitted in court (see Ceci & Bruck, 1995 , for a compreficulties in later monitoring their recollections that hypnotized subjects show. Studies briefly hensive review). The research activity with older people has also begun, but is less volureported in Jacoby et al. (1989, p. 413) and Roediger, Wheeler, and Rajaram (1993, pp. minous. For example, Johnson and her collaborators have asked if reality and source moni-114-122) provide evidence for this hypothesis (although neither study used groups tested toring is less accurate for children and for older adults than for young adults (e.g., Foley, under hypnosis for comparison). For example, Roediger et al. used a forced recall procedure Johnson, & Raye, 1983; Hashtroudi, Johnson, & Chrosniak, 1989) . Similarly, other in which subjects were made to guess during recall. They later asked subjects to rate all studies have shown that people high in imagery ability are more likely to be confused in items they had produced as to whether the response actually occurred during the study a reality monitoring paradigm after imagining events than are poor imagers (Johnson, Raye, phase of the experiment. They found that subjects who had guessed often judged that their Wang & Taylor, 1979) . As already noted above, another rich source of information is erroneous responses, presumably produced as guesses, had actually occurred. Therefore, it that supplied by various patient populations, as in the Kroll et al., Reinitz et al., and may be that the act of guessing while retrieving information about an event produces false Schacter et al. papers appearing in this issue.
Finally, people who score high on scales of memories even when subjects are not hypnotized. However, study of this possibility is just hypnotic suggestibility are more easily led to memory illusions than are those who score low. beginning.
• Illusions of judging and deciding. Many CONCLUSIONS cognitive illusions discovered by psycholoPerceptual illusions have been thoroughly gists studying judgment and decision making studied for nearly 150 years, whereas memory have a memorial basis. For example, the availillusions have been intensively studied for ability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) (perhaps) 30 years. Like perceptual illusions, refers to the tendency of decision makers to there are doubtless many types of memory assess the frequency of events by the ease illusions that are caused by different factors. with which instances come to mind. So, for We are as unlikely to find unitary explanations example, subjects judge that more people die of memory illusions as we are of perceptual from shark attacks than from being hit by fallillusions.
ing parts from airplanes, but actually the This essay has touched on only some illu-chances of dying from falling airplane parts sions that can be considered memory illusions. are 30 times higher (Plous, 1993) . Hindsight My survey in the second half of this paper bias and the knew-it-all-along effect may simwas motivated more by setting the stage for ilarly be caused by problems in assessing our articles in the special issue than by an exhaus-own metamemories (Fischoff, 1975 ; Wood, tive review of the relevant phenomena. I con-1978). After something has happened, we can clude by noting briefly a number of phenom-no longer access our mental state prior to the ena and issues that deserve attention and that happening, to see how unlikely we might then have not been emphasized here.
have judged the event to be. (The processes may be similar to those studied by Kelley and • Individual differences represent a rich Jacoby, this issue.) In a different arena, people related example, Glenberg, Wilkinson, and Epstein (1982) reported an illusion of knownotice and remember streaks of events and may then judge them as representative of a ing in which subjects' ratings of how well they comprehended a passage failed to corregeneral rule, even though careful analyses show that these streaks are probably occurring late with how well they could later answer questions about it (but see Weaver, 1991, for no more than would be expected by chance. For example, basketball players' belief in the some limitations on this finding). These examples could be extended (see Nelson, 1992) . phenomenon of the hot hand-that players suddenly get hot and make streaks of shotsTwo of the most famous illusions of memory-déjà vu and jamais vu-are illusions of is probably due to this illusion of perceiving and remembering clusters in a random se-metacognition. In the former case, which we have considered, people suffer the strange quence (Gilovich, Vallone, & Tversky, 1985) . These and other examples of phenomena of feeling that a new situation is very familiar; as noted, Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) anabias and illusion in judgment, often studied more by social psychologists than by cogni-lyzed this feeling as possibly arising from misattributed perceptual fluency in the apparently tive psychologists, seem to have their basis in memory illusions (see Gilovich, 1991; Pia-new situation. Jamais vu is the failure to find familiar something that was recently experitelli- Palmarini, 1994; and Plous, 1993 , for surveys of these phenomena). Just as there is no enced and should feel familiar. An experimental example may be the phenomenon of the firm dividing line between illusions of perceiving and remembering, there is no firm line recognition failure of recallable words, reported by Tulving and Thomson (1973) . Subbetween illusions of remembering and those of judging and deciding. Future work may jects fail to recognize in one context that a word has recently been presented, yet they seek commonalities that underlie illusions in different domains.
can recall that word as a recently experienced episode with a different cue. In pathological • Other illusions of metacognition. The study of metacognition-the assessment of cases, amnesic patients fail to recognize as familiar events that have been recently experiour own knowledge of how we learn and what we know-has greatly informed the study of enced and that can be produced in implicit or indirect tests of memory (Warrington & memory illusions. Studies of source monitoring, of remember/know judgments, and of Weiskrantz, 1968; Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1985) . However, the concept of jamais vu has over-and underconfidence in decisions all rely on metamemory judgments. However, the been given very little attention and the two phenomena mentioned here are not usually study of metacognition is rife with other possibilities (see Nelson, 1992 , for an introduction). raised in this context (although they seem to fit the definition). Whenever our metacognitive monitoring fails to track our performance accurately (and espe-
• The topic of memory illusions has not been confined to the psychologists' laboracially when our judgments about our performance are totally at odds with our behavior), tory, but is now a topic of concern in several areas of society. The accuracy of eyewitness our judgments reflect an illusion of knowing. For example, Nelson and Leonesio (1988) testimony (Munsterberg, 1908; Loftus, 1979) is of long-standing interest. The problem of showed that subjects would continue to study material (under self-paced study conditions) false identification of suspects and false reports of details in criminal investigations is of in attempting to master it, even though the additional study time produced little or no gain prime concern. Recently, the issue of memories that appear to be recovered in therapy in performance. Subjects could not accurately monitor when to call it quits in studying the (often an adult recalling being abused as a child) has been a topic of much debate (see information, which Nelson and Leonesio (1988) referred to as the labor-in-vain effect. In a Lindsay & Read, 1994; Loftus, 1993a) . Do
